Power station control and management systems represent key elements for guaranteeing the security of the power grid infrastructure. Intrinsically conceived to support the continuous provision of power in secure conditions, those systems today make intensive use of information and communication systems and are therefore exposed to related accidental and intentional cyber threats. This paper describes a simulation of cyber attacks conducted in the CESI RICERCA laboratory testbed on a prototypical substation control infrastructure with the purpose of testing their feasibility and illustrating their impact on the control system services.
Introduction
Owing to the pressure of cost reduction and productivity improvement, the power industry has been undergoing a strong evolution in recent years.
The optimisation of the power system performance in terms of reliability and availability at minimal operation and maintenance costs relies on the concepts of remote supervision and control of interconnected power structures, online power system monitoring to provide information to asset management, engineering and maintenance.
The trend towards remote operation and the availability of a variety of communication systems yielding relatively high bandwidth at reasonable cost has been leading the power utilities towards an increasingly extensive use of Information and Communication Technologies.
Communication networks are being used by technically advanced power utilities to support both real-time and non-real-time information exchange with obvious benefits, thus assuming a major role in power system management.
With the extensive use of communication systems, cyber security has become a relevant issue for utilities managing critical infrastructures.
The aim of this paper is to offer an analysis of the power system's vulnerability to potential cyber threats, by highlighting the plausibility and the effects of a set of attack scenarios carried out on a prototypal power system management system and by suggesting eventual countermeasures.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the architecture of the testbed used to implement the attack scenarios. Section 3 describes the implementation and the analysis of the selected attack categories: Phishing, Denial of Services, Viral Infections and Intrusions.
Testbed architecture
In recent years there has been a constant evolution in substation protection, supervision and monitoring mechanisms and the trend is towards the increasing use of distribution and integration in substation automation systems, communication being an important issue (Btand et al., 2003) . The CESI RICERCA laboratory testbed exemplifies what could be a typical control and communications architecture for a remotely controlled electric power substation (Dondossola et al., 2005b) . Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the information and communication system located at the Power Substation site, its subsystems and main components, and its connections to external systems (e.g., the Control Centre). The Substation site consists of a set of separated networked zones, each one characterised by a specific level of security and specific functionality. As evidenced in the figure, there are four interconnected Virtual Local Area Networks dedicated to the following functions: The described functionality relies on a number of assumptions, which are described in the following sections. 
The Process Control Network
The Process Control Network exemplifies a typical substation's secondary control system, consisting of a number of heterogeneous industrial controllers (Intelligent Electronic Devices, IEDs hereafter) and standard Windows-or Linux-based PCs, all connected by a Station Bus. As the experiment is focused on the vulnerabilities of the secondary system, no assumptions are made on the process and the interactions with the IED; i.e., the data may be acquired by means of both wired connections and a Process Bus. In the laboratory environment, both the process and the handling of the process data are simulated.
The industrial controllers implement low-and high-level automation sequences; the standard workstations provide support functions, like those performed by the Substation SCADA and the Human Machine Interface (HMI) of the local Control Centre.
The control IEDs are connected in a master slave architecture; slave IEDs communicate with each other and with the master, while only the master IED exchanges information with the Substation SCADA.
The Substation Computer handles all communications between the Process Control Local Area Network and the external world; i.e., communications with the local HMI, the Data Historian and with the Remote Control Centre.
The substation archive and web service
The Data Historian, implemented on a standard PC in a dedicated subnet, acts as a data server towards different typologies of substation data users. One of the client applications provides the visibility of substation data to the authorised personnel, such as substation maintainers and engineers, through standard internet accesses to the Substation Web Service. For security reasons, this public service is provided through another subnet.
Administration area
The schematic System Administration network in Figure 1 combines two distinct functions: the administrative tasks of a corporate network and the substation's ICT system management, which includes configuration and maintenance of the Central Firewall. Only this second function is considered in the attack scenarios reviewed in the paper, and for simplicity's sake the subnet is represented by a single workstation.
Local and remote connections
The four Local Area Networks (LANs) are connected by switched Ethernet. To enforce security requirements, all the communications are filtered by a Central Firewall.
The segmentation of the communication network in independent areas has the main objective of protecting the Process Control LAN from unauthorised and possibly malicious accesses (NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process Control Networks, 2005) .
The Process Control LAN uses two distinct communication channels to exchange information with the external world: one channel is a Virtual Private Network (VPN) over the public network (internet), the other is a local unidirectional channel towards the Substation Archive. The VPN connects the local site with the Remote Control Centre and is used for the remote control of the power station.
The Substation Public Service has a local, read-only communication channel towards the Substation Archive and a public access from the internet.
The Administration LAN is connected by a unidirectional local channel to the Substation Archive.
Attack scenarios: feasibility and risk evaluation
The number of cyber attacks that can be carried out against control systems and their network connections is vast. Therefore an exhaustive analysis of all possible attacks is out of the question, and all evaluation has to be done in a very selective way. By considering the elements that usually make up an attack, it is possible to identify some determinant features, which consent to structure the analysis with a restricted set of attack categories. These categories are studied in the more recent literature using the concepts of 'attack trees' and 'attack patterns' (Moore et al., 2001a) .
The scenarios experimented in the CESI RICERCA testbed (Dondossola et al., 2005a) have been selected with the aim of covering most of these attack categories, thus offering a sufficiently comprehensive view of the control system's vulnerability to potential cyber threats. The simulated attack scenarios, described in the following section, include website phishing, denial of service, viral infections and firewall intrusion followed by repudiation of action. Each attack shall be described in terms of its feasibility, its local effects on the subsystem or component, the possible evolution of the attack process and the severity of the potential damage on the attack's target.
Website phishing
The objective of a phishing attack is to gather information from legitimate users leveraging their confidence on the 'look and feel' of a web portal. Phishing attacks are usually carried out by making the target users connect with a malicious website, set up in a way to make them believe to be interacting with a legitimate one. As a result of this action, gullible users might supply sensitive data and/or login credentials to the attacker.
Phishing attacks are typically mounted in one of the following ways:
• by means of a faked e-mail, displaying a link, which seems to point to a legitimate site, but actually links to a malicious website • by poisoning the victim's Domain Name Servers, thus making them transparently connect to the malicious server.
Both solutions require some social engineering effort; in the first case it will be necessary to gather e-mail addresses, and learn what a legitimate official communication will look like; in the second case, the attacker will need to obtain information about the target Domain Name Servers (by social engineering or by technical means -e.g., fingerprinting).
In both cases, the target website needs to be accessible to the attacker in order to let him mimic the 'look and feel' (logos, fonts, graphical aspect) and the language used. Victims are then contacted by means of a counterfeited e-mail, (appearing, for instance, as an official communication), and requested to log into the malicious website for some typical operation (e.g., confirmation of their personal data, website maintenance, etc.). The login credentials of the deceived user are then collected and as a result, the attacker is able to use the stolen privileges to access the target website as if he/she were a legitimate user.
Careful implementations of this attack will not be noticed by the standard end user, as he/she will be forwarded directly to the legitimate site after the credentials have been provided to the malicious one.
In our scenario (see Figure 2 ), the phishing process is directed towards an authorised user of the Substation Web Server by means of an official looking e-mail. The attacker, after getting the e-mail address of the authorised user by means of some kind of social engineering, impersonates the role of one of the victim's colleagues and sends a plausible message, containing a link to a malicious website, which presents a look-alike copy of the web server's home page. The unsuspecting user clicks on the link, accesses the website and reveals his credentials to the attacker.
Both the gathering of the information about the graphical aspect of the substation web service's home page (by means of public domain search engines) and the implementation of the fake website are simple tasks. The immediate consequence of the phishing attack against the Substation Web Server is the loss of the confidentiality of substation data.
By stealing an authorised user's credentials, the attacker might have access to protected status information and learn about substation anomalies, alarm trends, etc.
At first sight, the loss of confidentiality can be considered a low-level risk because, in fact, it does not cause any power disservice.
But this attack should be considered under another perspective: not as a self-contained cyber attack but as the first act of a more complex attack process, composed of both physical and cyber acts, with the potential aim of causing severe consequences on the system services. For instance, by long-term monitoring of substation data, the attacker may gain information about an emergency status of the substation and exploit this momentum knowledge to carry out further attacks, which could lead to catastrophic disasters.
Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have the purpose of causing damage by drastically limiting, even denying, access to specific resources, thus making them unusable to intended users (Moore et al., 2001b) . Depending on the kind of resource (e.g., services such as file transfer, host, network connection and so on), and on its location (completely exposed, partially filtered by firewall, protected or non-exposed), the attacker may choose to leverage Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) vulnerabilities or design flaws; e.g., flooding the target with TCP requests (TCP vulnerability), or filling up the process memory (design or implementation flaw).
The severity of these attacks depends on the importance of the target resource, the minimum service requirements and the duration of the attack. It is also important to consider the possible domino effect with other systems or services depending on the attacked service.
DoS attacks are usually carried out against internet services, as for instance, public www and file transfer servers. But DoS attacks may also target internal (intranet) resources. These attacks may start from both internal and external sources, and may have single (DoS) or multiple sources (Distributed Denial of Service, DDoS hereafter).
In case of a single source, the attacker exploits a design or implementation vulnerability, causing a specific process to run out of resources (like memory or storage space). A second option would consist of band consumption; a consistent number of PCs will flood the target node with traffic, preventing it from replying to legitimate traffic (DDoS). The number of PCs needed to carry out a successful bandwidth consumption may vary depending on the resources available to the attacked service, and on the communication quality required to maintain an acceptable quality of service.
System bugs and bandwidth attacks are more general, and can be carried out against virtually any kind of target, regardless of the processes running on it. Design and implementation flaws are related to a specific service/application, and as they depend on the specific trait of the system, they can be more difficult to discover. On the other hand, these vulnerabilities are generally more difficult to mitigate, as the only solutions are to patch it or to switch to another system without that flaw. Obviously these options depend on the availability of patches or of alternative solutions.
Two DoS scenarios have been implemented and analysed on the CESI RICERCA testbed: one targeting the Substation Web Service and one directed at the VPN connecting the local site to its Remote Control Centre.
Web server DoS
In this scenario, the DoS attack exploits an implementation flaw of the supporting service: the attacker will repeatedly send a malicious request to the Substation Web Service, causing an abnormal consumption of memory, and the consequent unavailability of the service.
The severity of the damage must be evaluated from different perspectives, depending on the typology of the client.
From the point of view of the technical personnel assigned to the maintenance of the power system, the lack of information deriving from the DoS to the Substation Web Service can cause significant delay in the planning of their activities resulting in a non-negligible economic loss.
For the technicians appointed to the maintenance of the Substation's control system, the impossibility to monitor the condition of the control network results in problems whose importance depends on the state of the system. Should anomalies arise during a blackout, the lack of monitoring function could make the application of stated emergency procedures difficult.
But disabling the web service also means diminishing the possibility to remotely diagnose the status of the substation control network. This diminishes the resilience of the whole control system, which remains more vulnerable to, for instance, attacks to the VPN or to the Control Centre. In fact, DoS attacks may be followed by a chain of malfunctions in system services, whose actual damage depends on the target components affected.
VPN DoS
This scenario has been implemented using the technique of band consumption: a huge number of processes running on an attacker machine flooded the VPN node with traffic, with the effect of gradually slowing down the VPN connection as the traffic increased, until the bandwidth available to the VPN node was no longer sufficient to guarantee normal operations.
The effect consisted in the loss of a number of data packets sent by the Substation Computer to the Remote Centre: packets were received intermittently with blackout phases of different duration. But we have to point out that the DoS was caused by a single attacker and it is reasonable to suppose that more complex DoS or DDoS attacks would result in the total disruption of communications.
As evidenced by the test, a DoS attack to the VPN may cause information loss or even a full blackout of the connection, thus potentially having a strong impact on the power network. Should the attack be carried out in normal electric conditions, the consequences of a degradation (or failure) of the communication service would be mitigated by the presence of an alternative data archive in the substation site, and by the possibility of controlling the substation locally. But in case of a DoS attack during emergency conditions, the lack of intervention by the remote operator caused by unawareness of the process status could cause serious economic and safety damages.
Viral infection and malware
All environments connected to open networks share a common vulnerability threat: viral infection (Wang et al., 2000) . Viruses can be transmitted by any interaction with an external source, e.g., network connection, data download, in extension, all incoming data, both from network connections and local input streams (e.g., floppy disks, CD-ROM and any other kind of external storage media).
Even if a fully patched system provides a slightly higher level of security against viral infections and infection propagation, virus protection techniques rely massively on antivirus software, but this solution always leaves a window of vulnerability, which in the best case (very frequent virus definition updates), ranges from the time when the virus code is 'released' to the moment the antivirus software vendors release a new definition package updated with the new virus.
Damages caused by viruses may vary from minor disruption to major malfunction and even service disruption. In some cases, malware is also programmed to create a backdoor on the infected system (normally known as Trojan Horse), in order to allow the attacker to remotely control the infected workstation.
Two different scenarios based on viral infection have been tested in our laboratory: one aimed to show the impact of a viral infection transmitted by a Work Station in the Remote Control Centre to the Operator Console, and one to see the effects of virus propagation from the remote site to the Substation's local site through the VPN.
Viral infection of the Remote Control Centre
This scenario required the viral infection of some of our laboratory machines. Besides the legal problems related to the use of malicious software, we had no intention of exposing our testbed to an uncontrolled virus propagation. Therefore, the workstation in the Remote Control Centre was 'infected' through a custom-made User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding process, simulating a UDP flooding worm, such as Slammer and Sobig.
The first step in the implementation of the scenario consisted in the installation of a Trojan with backdoor software on the operator's machine. This option is extremely dangerous, as the presence of a backdoor allows an attacker to take complete control of a target machine.
To carry out this preparatory phase, the attacker was deemed to cause a legitimate user to run a malicious application on the supervision workstation by means of social engineering (i.e., fake e-mail, innocuous looking CD, etc.). This application then installed a backdoor in the target workstation, allowing the attacker to gain remote control of the target system.
At this point, the attacker had no problem in propagating the infection from a workstation in the Control Centre to the operator's machine by uploading and executing the UDP flooding executable through the backdoor.
We first observed the effects of the propagation of the infection inside the Remote Control Centre: it caused an overload of the system's internal communication mechanism and the consequent blackout in the monitoring function of the remote operator's interface. The log window of the Operator Station went blank as the status information flow stopped.
As the testbed includes two disjoint monitoring functions, one for planning and maintenance and one for operation, the two interfaces presented two different views of the substation components: the web server supplied view was up to date, and the operator's was not.
The consequences of a wrong perception of the state of the control system deserve an in-depth analysis.
When the automation system works correctly, no plant anomaly requires automatic handling and no alarm condition requires the operator's intervention, the inconsistency of the monitoring information is hardly perceptible. But of course, even the smallest emergency is hard to deal with, in the absence of timely state information.
Next, as the worst case, we simulated a viral infection reaching the operator's machine and then propagating itself through the private communication channel (VPN) to the Process Control LAN. The propagation of the infection via UDP flooding simulated a flaw in a well-known commercial software tool.
The worm reached the Windows PC hosting the substation SCADA and then flooded one of the targets connected by the Process Network, blocking its communication channel.
The impact of this kind of attack strongly depends on the architecture of the substation's secondary apparatus. In our laboratory, the control software is distributed in a master/slave architecture, with fault-tolerance capabilities.
In this case, we observed the automation system's capability to maintain its functionality by redistributing the computational load on the working automation targets: the fault-tolerance mechanisms present in the automation environment dealt with the viral infection as with any accidental malfunction of the control architecture.
If the viral infection is limited to a subset of the slave IEDs, then the impact of the attack is the (performance and/or functional) degradation of the control system. In the presence of a powerful virus infecting the whole control system, the fault-tolerant capabilities of the automation support will not be able to grant the needed control of the substation. In both cases, there is an evident economic and safety impact on the system service.
Intrusion into the central firewall
The main objective of an intrusion into the Central Firewall of the Substation is to obtain authorised access to the firewall with administrator's privileges thus gaining access to the subnets controlled by the firewall. Secure SHell (SSH) is usually the means by which administrators access and program the firewall.
Like any other service provided to a community over the internet, SSH is exposed to a large number of attacks: for instance, they can be targets of DoS and DDoS attempts.
As for any kind of service, an incomplete or wrong configuration of SSH may lead to severe security threats, such as SSH1 encryption break, to password brute forcing. Despite the availability of security-related information, and detailed guidelines about security enhancements, a large number of services are still deployed with the default configuration.
For this scenario, we devised an attack originated by a malicious insider (maybe a disloyal employee) acting at the substation site. The attacker used brute force to steal user credentials (login/password) and then gained shell access to the system as root with full administrator privileges.
This kind of attack can have several consequences: it can be actually considered as a first step towards a variety of insider attacks against the subnets of the local site. It is important to stress that the intruder may gain full control of the workstation hosting the firewall and therefore liberty to gather information and to introduce malware. Blocking all the interactions inside the LAN is just one of the options, another being carrying out a DoS attack to the Master controller.
In the case study, we experimented the uploading of a scanning software in order to analyse the local network's architecture and the propagation of the UDP flooding worm used to cause the crash of the whole automation system. The effects deriving from the attacker's tampering with the local site's central firewall's rules depend on the services attacked. One of the possibilities consists of cutting off the communications between the Process Control Network and the Data Historian. The unavailability of the Station Archive, besides the loss of data, causes the blackout of the Substation Web Service.
One fundamental consideration is that the damage provoked by a cyber attack can go beyond the loss of the services provided by the targeted subsystem. The analysis has to contemplate all the possible event -chains departing from each attack -considering both the possible domino effect induced on other systems or services, and the damage caused by the combined effects of a number of interrelated attacks.
Considerations about countermeasures
The simulation tests described previously show how even simple and elementary attacks may cause potentially non-negligible damages especially in the case of infrastructures having critical missions. Unfortunately, not all the known attacks can be avoided in an easy manner (for example applying some patch) and there exist types of attacks that cannot be avoided at all, but only, in the best cases, mitigated. The attacks presented in this paper give a good overview of this fact.
Let us consider the Web Server DoS. In our implementation we exploited a well-known bug contained in the Apache 2.0 web server. As explained before, such vulnerability can be exploited by sending a particular, ad hoc formed packets to the server, causing then a memory overflow and consequent DoS. This is an example of easy-to-solve system lack.
In fact, in order to avoid such threats, it is sufficient to make the server updated and to apply a server patch when it is just released. Of course, the faster this action, the smaller the exposition windows in which an attack could be successfully exploited. It is then necessary, where possible, to implement mechanisms of automated update or at least, of automated alerting, with the aim to inform the security officer about new vulnerabilities and then new patches available for a target system. Such a way to proceed should be inserted in the security policies of every critical infrastructure.
However, sometimes, especially in particular contexts using a mixture of proprietary/third party software (as the case presented previously), owing to compatibility problems, it is not easy (or cheap) to apply system patches. In this case, the only way available to protect the system, is to insert new, ad hoc rules in the firewall monitoring the traffic directed to the target system, to prevent the damage by dropping the malicious packets. However, in this case we note that in the particular case presented, and in a lot of other possible examples, we are speaking of vulnerabilities caused by malformed application layer packets. In order to recognise such type of packets, the firewall needs to be able to understand, reconstruct and analyse such packets, and then it needs to know the associated application layer protocol; this implies the use of particular types of firewall (Stalling, 2000) . Moreover, if, for example, the traffic flows through an encrypted channel (e.g., Secure Socket Layer (SSL)), the firewall has no chance to analyse the packets at application layer, so there is the need to implement ad hoc mechanisms strongly related to the network architecture of the particular system in order to allow the firewall to analyse the traffic before it causes damage.
Even the attack against the VPN can be identified as a DoS attack, but in this case, the technique used, i.e., bandwidth consumption, even if brute, is not easy to avoid. In fact, every request sent to the VPN server, is perfectly legal (i.e., they cannot be dropped a priori, and the VPN server simply stops to work because it has limited resources, and it is not able to process more than a certain number of requests in a time unit. In the scientific literature about such type of denial of service, a definitive countermeasure has not been identified yet.
Some countermeasures can be then related to the implementation of some more sophisticated techniques, such as network load balancing, router pushback (Ioannidis and Bellovin, 2002) , QoS analysis (Garg and Reddy, 2002) , etc. However, such countermeasures are only able to mitigate the effects of this type of attack. In fact, an attacker sufficiently determined and with enough resources can, in every moment, overpass the maximum resource bound of a target system. The viral infection scenario represents a risk that can be avoided in a semi-automatic way with a good level of success. The easier countermeasure is in fact to install in as many computers as possible in the network an antivirus configured to make multiple updating check everyday.
Considering the scenario presented before, however, in which we have a really dedicated environment, some questions need to be exhaustively explored about the real impact of full-time antiviral monitoring of a target system, which must provide near real-time performances.
In any case, the antivirus, where applicable, allows to create a good shield against common viruses. However, because of the exposition time window, the antivirus reduces but not eliminates the possibility of infection. Furthermore, because of the criticality of the scenario we considered, we need to take into account even the scenario in which an attacker creates an ad hoc virus (exactly as we did in our tests), that will be injected into the system by the use of some social engineering techniques. In such a case, a wide number of antivirus will fail in the detection, because they commonly use a signature-driven detection. However, we must not forget that on the basis of a number of this type of scenario, there are some social engineering actions (e-mail sent to convince someone to activate a virus, etc.). In this case, a good security alphabetisation of the people working in the system may constitute an effective way to mitigate the spread of such threat.
At the same way, in the case of phishing, the first, most relevant countermeasure is the security education of the users.
1 Moreover, the use of cryptographic mechanism in order to sign e-mail could be a good way to avoid the attacker to fake e-mails.
The last scenario presented, the SSH intrusion, is of course one of the simplest to avoid; the countermeasure could be simply to change the configuration of the firewall. However, the simplicity is only superficial. In fact, before applying such a countermeasure, we need to identify that the vulnerability exists. This task, in a small system could be easy to do, but in a wide network, with several machines, configurations and profiles, it could be a titanic work. So in this case, the challenge is to discover the misconfiguration and not to patch it. In this case, it has a prominent position a correct analysis work in the system design phase. However, the periodical use of some vulnerability checkers tools (see for example Nessus 2 ) could be helpful for a posteriori analysis.
Finally, it is necessary to make another relevant consideration. Every time a computer is compromised, its usual behaviour deviates from what we can identify as its normal profile. This is, of course, an important warning about a possible system corruption. In order to identify such a behaviour modification, in the last years, a new research field has started to be explored, the field of anomaly detection. There exist nowadays several examples of anomaly detection-based Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) and Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) (Bishop, 2004) . However, several tests have shown that such an approach have good results in environments strongly homogeneous (in terms of tasks, operations and type of machines to be controlled), and bad results in heterogeneous environments (in which several false positives or negatives are generated causing information overhead). To our knowledge, a scientific study about the application of anomaly detection in industrial environments has not been realised yet. However, considering that the tasks, the software, the actions characterising such a type of environment are strongly defined a priori, it is reasonable to consider this solution as a promising technique (of course, to be improved), to identify anomalous behaviour and then possible, not yet discovered, system corruption.
Importance of security policies
As evidenced by the scenarios tested in our laboratory, it is imperative that technology producers, operators of critical systems and users take appropriate steps to ensure the integrity of critical infrastructures, averting the risk of cyber attacks.
The evaluation of the cyber risks considered in this paper points out the importance of assessing and testing the level of security of substation control systems. The results of the assessment can then be used for defining (in case of new systems) or adjusting (in case of existing systems), the objectives and requirements of the security policy, and for the determination of the security functions and assurance measures needed for satisfying those objectives and requirements.
A first consideration is that security can be improved by making use of well-known, already available security measures, such as implementing better authentication systems and providing more training to get personnel pay attention to security. However it is difficult -if not impossible -to prevent social engineering or to oppose phishing attacks only by technical means. Cyber security measures should also identify and address the human factors that can lead to security breaches: an employee may let down his guard and open a private e-mail message with no malicious intent, paving the way for the introduction of malware to the system. The best way to address the human side of the security equation is training and education. The focus here is not only to ensure that employees know the policies and procedures, but also to have them think about their actions and understand all the ramifications.
Conclusion and future work
The protection of critical infrastructures from all kinds of threats and attacks is of vital importance for utilities and end users and has become an issue of major international interest. As a consequence, the assessment of the vulnerabilities of industrial systems to potential cyber threats has been accepted as an activity bearing strong strategic and operative relevance in the electric community.
To this effect, much work has been done to identify possible cyber attacks, study their feasibility and evaluate the severity of their effects on interconnected systems, although there still remain aspects for further analysis.
During the development of the attack scenarios, a risk assessment methodology (Dondossola et al., 2006) has been applied to the testbed. The experience allowed to clarify which are the typical interactions between the activity of cyber security assessment and the system testing against cyber attacks.
First of all, the System Security Profiles produced by the assessment contributed to the identification of a plan of attack processes to be implemented. Once executed, the results of the attack processes allowed to validate the estimates assumed during the assessment, and to confirm or update the System Security Profiles.
But as evidenced in the paper, another topic worthy of thorough investigation is related to the possible preventive and countermeasures; the evaluation of the experimented scenarios should be a useful guideline for future research having this objective.
